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ABSTRACT: . The persistence of high prices for international mobile roaming services, in contrast to falling national mobile prices, 
has been a recognised item on the global regulatory agenda for half a decade. In Africa, there have been studies and discussions 
about regulatory options in regional economic groups and in the various networks of national regulators. As yet, there has been 
no transnational regulatory action. Yet the initiative of one large operator saw the introduction of transnational tariff schemes 
(ie without a surcharge for roaming), forcing competitors to collaborate in order to respond, if they wished to attract and to retain 
customers. This has both saved money for consumers and greatly reduced the need for regulatory interventions that might have 
proved counterproductive. In some countries this type of offer remains impossible, because international gateways are a 
monopoly, having yet to be opened to competition
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INTRODUCTION1
Recent years have seen remarkable growth in cellular wireless telecommunications in Africa, 
rising to over 350 million reported connections, equivalent to just over one-third of the population 
(see Figure 1). The predominant technology has been GSM, with only some 10% being 
connections using CDMA (CDG, 2010), plus a very few individuals with satellite telephones, 
supplied by Inmarsat and Thuraya. However, these numbers are significantly and systematically 
overstated, due to the ownership by many individuals of multiple SIM-cards – with the resulting 
need to take at least 20% off official mobile teledensity figures (Sutherland, 2009).
FIGURE 1: GROWTH OF MOBILE CONNECTIONS IN AFRICA
  
    Source: UN, 2010
1                        An earlier pre-print version of this article is available as LINK Public Policy Research Paper No. 10. 
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An overwhelming majority of these customers are pre-paid (see Figure 2). This reflects 
individuals’ low levels of disposable income, their uncertainty about future availability of cash 
and their lack of experience in the use of credit. Moreover, the operators have access to credit 
histories for only a tiny minority of their prospective customers, making risk assessment 
entirely impractical. In contrast, top-ups for mobile phone services are widely available at 
locations close to customers and in small, affordable increments.
FIGURE 2: PREPAID CUSTOMERS IN SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIES IN 
                               2008
   Source: ITU, 2009
For Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) in Africa, International Mobile Roaming (IMR) is a very 
attractive service, both for inbound and outbound roamers. Inbound roaming traffic generated 
by tourists, business travellers, visiting journalists, government officials and the like can be 
highly lucrative – even in war zones – with foreigners making expensive IMR calls from airports, 
hotels and offices. The traffic is paid for by the home MNO in foreign currency and requires no 
marketing effort, with the only financial risk being fraud control for which procedures are well 
established (eg accelerated transfer of records) (GSMA, 2007). Outbound roaming appeals to a 
set of high-spending domestic customers, such as government ministers and business leaders, 
who wish to use their phones all over the world. To secure these influential customers and to 
avoid them switching to a domestic rival, operators enter into a very wide range of contracts 
for IMR, even in countries where the likelihood that the service will be used might seem small.
For the predominantly poor customer base the option of paying very high rates for IMR simply 
does not exist. Instead, they find inexpensive alternatives, of which the most obvious is to 
purchase a local SIM-card and thus engage in “plastic roaming”. This causes inconvenience for 
colleagues, family and friends, who are no longer able to call them on their usual number.
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Africa now has a number of geographically extensive operator groups, recently modified by the 
acquisition of Atlantique by Etisalat and by the sale of most of the Zain networks to Bharti Airtel 
(see Table 1). Their geographical scale allows them the possibility to internalise at least a 
portion of their IMR traffic, except where they cannot obtain their own international gateway. 
In a few countries there remains a formal monopoly, requiring all international traffic to pass 
through the incumbent operator. These countries are: Angola, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Gambia and Zimbabwe (ITU, 2010).
TABLE 1: GEOGRAPHICAL FOOTPRINTS OF TRANSNATIONAL OPERATORS
Airtel* Zain Lap   
Green
Millicom MTN † Orange Orascom Portugal
Telekom
Vodafone
 ‡
Algeria X◊
Angola X
Benin X
Botswana X X
Burkina Faso X
Cameroon X X X
Cape Verde Islands X
Central African Rep. X
Chad X X
Congo (Brazzaville) X X
Congo (DR) X X X
Egypt X X X
Equatorial Guinea X
Gabon X
Ghana X X X
Guinea (Conakry) X
Guinea Bissau X X
Ivory Coast X X X
Kenya X X X
Lesotho X
Liberia X
Madagascar X X
Mali X
Malawi X
Mauritius X X
Morocco X
Mozambique X
Namibia X
Niger X X X
Nigeria X X
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Airtel* Zain Lap   
Green
Millicom MTN † Orange Orascom Portugal
Telekom
Vodafone
      ‡
Rwanda X X
Såo Tomé & Principe X
Senegal X X
Seychelles X
Sierra Leone X X
South Africa X X
Sudan X X X
Swaziland
Tanzania X X X
Togo X
Tunisia X
Uganda X X X X
Zambia X X
Zimbabwe
   
* Rebranded from Zain. 
† Trading as Tigo. 
‡ Including Safaricom and Vodacom. 
◊ Sold in November 2010 to Wataniya, while other interests are to be merged with Vimpelcom.
   Source: Websites of Zain, Millicom, MTN Group, Orange, Orascom, Portugal Telecom, Vodafone, GSM World
Historians and political scientists have frequently commented on and complained about the 
arbitrary boundaries imposed on Africa by the colonial powers in the 19th century and retained 
at independence in the 20th century (Touval, 1999; Laremont, 2005). These borders often 
ignored languages and cultures, many of which were left straddling lines drawn on a map by 
someone in Berlin, London or Paris. One consequence of this is that people quite naturally 
cross borders, and wish to continue using a mobile phone service.
This paper examines the overall market for IMR services in Africa. It then considers the “One 
Network” tariff from the Zain Group and the responses from other operators. The various 
regulatory initiatives undertaken in the regional economic communities are considered. The 
introduction of roaming hubs is then examined. Finally, conclusions are drawn and issues 
identified for future research.
THE ISSUE OF IMR CHARGES 
The persistence of high charges for IMR was noted as early as 1999, in contrast to a general 
decline of mobile charges, in complaints addressed to the European Commission (EC) 
(Sutherland, 2001). A number of competition law mechanisms were used in attempts to address 
this problem, with remarkably little success, and despite efforts to identify the problem, 
provided remarkably few useful insights. Then in 2007 transnational legislation was adopted 
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by the European Union (EU), imposing wholesale and retail price caps, together with 
transparency measures (EU, 2009). While politically effective, it was an economically crude 
instrument, one that further complicated analyses of the markets (Sutherland, 2010).
Rightly or wrongly, IMR has come to be seen as a policy and regulatory problem, rather than as 
a commercial challenge or opportunity. It became a feature of international policy and regulatory 
discussions, being raised at regional bodies for Asia-Pacific, the Americas, the Arab states and 
Africa. It was also taken up at the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD, 2009). It was discussed at the ITU-T in Study Group 3, first in 2002 and again in 2009-10 
(ITU-T, 2010). The ITU-D  held discussions at its 2006 Global Symposium for Regulators (GSR) 
and included a chapter on IMR in the 2008 edition of Trends in Telecommunications Reform 
(ITU, 2008). IMR was also included in the ICT Regulatory Toolkit (infoDev & ITU, 2010). The 
IMR problem had become part of orthodox regulatory agenda, something that ought to be 
considered.
However, there has been a poor level of understanding of the economics of roaming, not least 
because of the shortage of data, especially concerning the operations of wholesale markets. 
This has delayed and perhaps confounded the identification of a solution to the IMR problem in 
the form of an intervention in the market.
Individual governments and regulators have been caught in a form of Catch 22, being expected 
to act but being unable to do much that is likely to be other than counterproductive. Collective 
action requires a legal basis that, outside the EU, does not exist except, conceivably, in free 
trade agreements.
Thus while the problem of IMR has been recognised, there are only very limited analyses and 
no solutions. There is no robust and detailed model of roaming markets with which potential 
interventions can be tested, nor even satisfactory data to construct such a model. Governments 
and regulators are thus forced to conduct experiments in the real world with very limited 
certainty of outcomes, something that, understandably, gives rise to hesitancy. This is 
compounded by the need for collaborative action between groups of governments and regulators 
in which interests are often poorly aligned.
THE AFRICAN ROAMING MARKET
In 2008, the global market for roaming was estimated to be worth USD24.5 billion, with some 
365 million outbound roamers. Of that total, African countries represented only one percent of 
roamers, though forecast to grow to around three percent by 2013 (see Figure 3). A substantial 
majority of the African roamers were consumers rather than business travellers, though both 
groups were forecast to grow.
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FIGURE 3: FORECAST OF TOTAL OUTBOUND ROAMERS FROM  AFRICAN   
                               MNOS
   Source: Stainthorpe, 2008
Unfortunately, there are no equivalent estimates for inbound roamers, making it very difficult 
to assess the market dynamics or to understand the net cash flows. Only when inbound and 
outbound roamers are both accounted for can the effects of IMR be analysed. Countries in North 
Africa and some of the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) are likely to have heavy volumes 
of inbound traffic from tourists and from return visits of migrant workers.
Unusually, there are data for roaming traffic for the Cape Verde Islands. These show the 
expected preponderance of inbound over outbound traffic (see Table 2). The effects of the global 
financial crisis can be seen in the sharp drop in traffic in 2009.
TABLE 2: ROAMING TRAFFIC TO AND FROM CAPE VERDE ISLANDS  
                              (MINUTES) 
2006 2007 H1 2007 H2 2008 H1 2008 H2 2009 H1 2009 H2
Inbound 2 460 218 1 228 046 1 263 128 1 345 419 1 345 176 1 619 123 760 166
Outbound 66 537 49 701 62 115 61 287 101 361 490 473 147 901
Net traffic 2 393 681 1 178 345 1 201 013 1 284 132 1 243 815 1 128 650 612 265
       
   Source: ANAC, 2010
Taking the 2005 data on tourists visiting the Cape Verde Islands, some 198 000 visitors (of a 
total population of 500 000), represented about 13 minutes per visitor over an average stay of 
4 to 5 nights. In 2008, outbound roaming represented only 0.1% of total mobile voice traffic, 
while inbound roaming was about 2.4%, though it was likely to be a higher portion of the 
international calls originating on mobile networks. Given the higher charges, the revenues 
would not be in proportion.
The revenues earned by African MNOs from outbound roaming are shown in Figure 4. There 
are minimal amounts from SMS and data roaming, with the vast majority of the money coming 
from voice traffic. The forecast growth comes mostly from roaming between countries in Africa.
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FIGURE 4: TOTAL OUTBOUND ROAMING REVENUES OF AFRICAN MNOS  
                        
   Source: Stainthorpe, 2008
Although there are no data on inbound roamers, it is possible to consider the prices they pay, 
for example, the IMR tariffs charged to visitors from the US. Table 3 shows the prices charged 
in the summer of 2006, Table 4 and Table 5 for the summers of 2009 and 2010. The same broad 
pattern applies to all, with a “flat rate” charge, the same per minute rate for incoming, local 
and international calls. If customers pay an additional monthly fee, usually on an annual ba-
sis, lower rates are available. For the most part, the prices are quite expensive, in some cases 
extremely so. In particular, calls forwarded to Kenya from the US, where the wholesale cost 
would be a few cents, are charged at USD3.99 or 4.99 per minute. The differences between the 
tables suggest there is little, if any, competition between the operators in the US and give the 
appearance that the operators are engaged in an upward price spiral, copying the higher prices 
of their domestic rivals. Although some of their customers engage in plastic roaming, it would 
appear not to exert any pressure on the home operators.
TABLE 3: ROAMING CHARGES FOR US-BASED CUSTOMERS IN AUGUST    
                              2006 
Cingular Standard Cingular 
World traveler 
Sprint T-Mobile Verizon 
Global phone
South Africa 2.49 1.69 1.50 1.49 2.49
Mozambique 3.49 3.49 1.50 1.99 1.29
Malawi 4.99 4.99 - 1.99 1.29
Tanzania 3.99 3.99 1.50 4.99 1.29
Kenya 3.49 3.49 1.50 4.99 4.99
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Cingular Standard Cingular 
World traveler
Sprint T-Mobile Verizon 
Global phone
Ethiopia 3.49 3.49 - - -
Sudan 3.49 3.49 - - -
Egypt 2.49 2.29 1.50 1.99 -
  Source: Sutherland, 2006
TABLE 4: INTERNATIONAL ROAMING CHARGES FOR US-BASED  
                              CUSTOMERS IN AUGUST 2009
AT&T 
Standard
AT&T 
World traveler
Sprint T-Mobile* Verizon
Global phone+
South Africa 2.49 1.69 2.49 1.49 2.89/2.29
Mozambique 2.49 2.49 2.49 1.99 2.89/2.29
Malawi 3.49 3.49 3.49 1.99 2.89/2.29
Tanzania 4.99 4.99 4.99 4.99 4.99/3.99
Kenya 3.99 3.99 3.99 4.99 4.99/3.99
Ethiopia 3.49 3.49 3.49 2.99 2.89/2.29
Sudan 3.49 3.49 3.49 - 2.89/2.29
Egypt 2.49 2.29 2.49 1.99 2.89/2.29
* Roaming charges do not include local tolls or long distance charges.
+ The higher rate is the standard roaming plan and the lower rate is the value plan. 
   Source: Websites of AT&T T-Mobile, Verison
TABLE 5: INTERNATIONAL ROAMING CHARGES FOR US-BASED  
                               CUSTOMERS IN AUGUST 2010
AT&T 
Standard
AT&T
 World traveler
Sprint Sprint 
with plan
T-Mobile* Verizon
Global phone+
South Africa 2.49 1.69 2.49 1.69 2.49 2.89/1.69
Mozambique 2.49 2.49 2.49 2.29 2.49 2.89/2.29
Malawi 3.49 3.49 3.49 2.99 3.49 2.89/2.29
Tanzania 4.99 4.99 4.99 3.99 4.99 4.99/3.99
Kenya 3.99 3.99 3.99 - 4.99 4.99/3.99
Ethiopia 3.49 3.49 3.49 2.29 3.49 2.89/2.29
Sudan 3.49 3.49 3.49 2.29 - 2.89/2.29
Egypt 2.49 2.29 2.49 2.29 2.49 2.89/2.29
* Roaming charges do not include local tolls or long distance charges.
+ The higher rate is the standard roaming plan and the lower rate is the value plan. 
   Source: Websites of AT&T T-Mobile, Verison
10
the african journal of information and communication issue 11 2010/2011
The net effects of IMR in African countries are very difficult to assess in the absence of data on 
the inbound number of minutes and the associated revenues. Even the relatively expensive rates 
charged to visiting Americans cannot be fully evaluated without the wholesale rates paid by the US-based 
MNOs to their African IMR partners. Nonetheless, it seems likely that the bulk of the profits on IMR calls for 
visitors from developed countries are retained at home. Moreover, the regulators in developed countries 
ought to examine IMR tariffs in Africa for evidence of lack of competition on their own retail markets, and 
conceivably for evidence of collusion.
ONE NETWORK
Celtel was a leading African mobile operator with a substantial geographical presence, often in adjoining 
countries, built up at a time when the continent was considered much less inviting for MNOs. In March 2005, 
the Mobile Telecommunications Company (MTC) of Kuwait, announced it had a binding agreement to 
acquire 100% of the shares of Celtel International BV for USD3.36 billion. In September 2007, MTC adopted 
the use of the Zain brand (Zain, 2007).
At the end of 2006, MTC launched its new strategy “ACE”: 
•	 Accelerating	the	growth	in	Africa
•	 Consolidating	the	existing	assets	
•	 Expanding	into	adjacent	markets.
This was to achieve 3x3x3: “It is the strategy that will make Zain a global player in three stages: regional, 
international and global, with each stage completed in three years, with an aim of reaching a customer base 
of 150 million. In essence, with this expansion plan, we aim to achieve in nine years what other companies 
have taken more than 27 years to achieve” (Zain, 2007).
However, the expansion did not last long and having overextended its reach, Zain sold its African operations, 
other than in Morocco and Sudan, to Bharti of India for USD10.7 billion in March 2010 (Mookerji, 2010). 
These networks were rebranded “Airtel” later the same year (Telecoms, 2010).
MSI, subsequently part of Celtel and later Zain, had operations on both sides of the River Congo, in The 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and in The Republic of Congo (M2 Presswire, 2002). Although 
Kinshasa and Brazzaville, the two capitals, are separated by only seven kilometres, telephone traffic 
between MSI’s two MNOs was routed to the respective fixed incumbent operators, which only interconnected 
in Europe. The costs for this were considerable and had the effect of suppressing demand for calls between 
the two neighbours. MSI was eventually able to obtain the necessary licences and installed a microwave 
link across the River Congo in 2002, allowing it to cut its charges by 80% and thus greatly increase traffic 
volumes. This type of problem was replicated on different scales at many borders in Africa.
In East Africa changes made by the governments gradually liberalised international telecommunications, 
allowing Celtel and later Zain to own and to interconnect its gateways. In 2004 Kenya joined Tanzania and 
Uganda in this liberalisation, allowing Celtel to launch reduced rates for calls between the three countries 
(Zain, 2005). Then in 2006, Zain announced a One Network offer eliminating IMR surcharges for both post-
paid and pre-paid customers in East Africa (see Table 6). With all the traffic retained on its own networks, 
roaming had been fully internalised and with no roaming onto the networks of rivals, there could be no 
out-payments. A more conventional approach to pre-paid roaming, with high charges and requiring an 
expensive technical platform, was considered highly unlikely to stop customers switching to rivals.
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The One Network offer was gradually extended westward to the Atlantic Ocean, covering an area greater 
than the EU and becoming available to nearly half the population of the continent. The exception was 
Zambia, whose government refused Zain its own international gateway, officially for reasons of national 
security. MNOs there were required to pay the fixed incumbent operator for their international traffic, the 
government forcing them to support Zamtel in preparation for its privatisation. Instead of One Network, 
Zain offered its Zambian customers only very limited pre-paid roaming (eg to the UK). Finally, the government 
relented, allowing competition in international gateways and thus One Network could be offered there 
(Malakata, 2010). 
TABLE 6: THE GROWTH OF THE ZAIN ONE NETWORK
2006 June 2007 November 2007 2009 2010
Kenya Democratic Republic of     
Congo
Burkina Faso Ghana Zambia
Tanzania Gabon Chad Sierra Leone
Uganda Republic of Congo Malawi Madagascar
Gabon Niger
Nigeria
Sudan
 
   Source: Zain press releases
The Zain One Network tariff introduced a special case, which rivals found difficult to copy. If, say, someone 
living in Uganda has a relative or friend working in Kenya, then if they both use SIM-cards from their 
countries of residence they must pay for international calls. However, if both use Zain Kenya SIM-cards then 
the person in Kenya can call the person in Uganda for the price of a domestic call, making a considerable 
saving (see Table 7). All that is required is a little “juggling” of SIM-cards, to ensure that calls are made on 
SIM-cards of the same nationality – presumably they would wish mostly to be on a local SIM-card for local 
family, friends and colleagues.
TABLE 7: PREPAID TARIFFS OF ZAIN KENYA IN 2009 (KENYA SHILLINGS)  
                               (ZAIN, 2009)
To Zain Kenya To Zain Uganda
Pamoja - peak 7 32
Pamoja - off-peak 3 23
Vuka - peak 8 32
Vuka - off-peak 8 23
Roaming in Uganda 15 15
ZR1 = KES9.75
   Source: Zain Website
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The One Network offer was extended to data and Internet access in May 2009 (Zain, 2009). 
Initially, this covered Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda and some countries in the Levant. The Zain 
One Office tariff allowed the use of GPRS across East Africa. The prices are shown in Table 8, 
converted into ZAR to simplify comparisons.
TABLE 8: ZAIN ONE OFFICE GPRS TARIFFS IN EAST AFRICA IN NOVEMBER  
                               2009 (PER MINUTE) 
Kenya Tanzania Uganda
KES ZAR TZS ZAR UGX ZAR
Zain Kenya – 
Prepaid
32.79 3.36 23.96 2.46
Zain Kenya – 
Postpaid
27.10 2.78 19.01 1.95
Zain Tanzania – 
Prepaid
365 2.17 417 2.48
Zain Tanzania – 
Postpaid
292 1.73 333 1.98
Zain Uganda – 
Prepaid
524 2.10 818 3.27
Zain Uganda – 
Postpaid 
403 1.61 656 2.62
ZAR1 = KES9.75 = TZS168.35 = UGX250
  Source: Websites of: Zain Kenya, Zain Tanzania, Zain Uganda
The One Network scheme eliminated all IMR charges for both post-paid and pre-paid customers – 
they simply paid the applicable national rates for outbound calls and received inbound calls free of 
charge, as if they were at home. Pre-paid customers were additionally able to purchase top-up cards 
locally to maintain their credit balance. Since customers were almost exclusively pre-paid they would 
never have paid traditional IMR charges, but would instead change their SIM-cards at the border. It 
therefore made commercial sense to abandon established IMR charging models in order to avoid 
customers switching to a rival operator. It also allowed customers access to all of their stored credit 
and ensured cross-border communications, keeping friends and families connected.
George Held, Zain’s Marketing Director for One Network noted, “When we launched it in DRC, there 
was a surge in customers in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania because of these cross-border activities, 
especially the lake area” (The New Vision, 2009).
Zain also offered conventional data roaming using GPRS, with both post-paid and pre-paid tariffs, to 
a range of destinations (Daily Trust, 2008). This has been presented as a premium service, intended 
to attract high-spending customers. An even more exotic form of IMR was available through 
Aeromobile, which provided a roaming service for Zain customers on flights operated by the Emirates 
airline (Leadership, 2008).
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While it has been argued that One Network drove up traffic volumes for Zain there are only vague 
hints from the operator to support this view, which are undermined by the UN World Tourism 
Organisation reporting only a few tens of thousands of individuals crossing these borders 
each year (Gillwald & Mureithi, 2010). Rather, it appears that Zain obtained considerable 
publicity from the One Network plan, which it used to support the expensive process of 
rebranding, helping it to attract more domestic customers. It incurred some regulatory costs 
in negotiating the necessary permissions. One Network also had a significant effect on rivals, 
which felt it necessary to respond, even if not on the same scale. It needs to be recalled that 
Zain maintained its conventional roaming business for post-paid visitors, especially those 
from developed countries. The attractions of the One Network tariff to Zain were a complex 
mixture; discomfiting rivals, encouraging customers not to switch to rivals and driving up 
domestic market numbers.
RESPONSES TO ONE NETWORK
The other large MNO groups in Africa, notably MTN, Orange and Vodafone, have all felt 
themselves to be under sufficient pressure from Zain to respond to One Network. Clearly, 
Zain anticipated that this would require difficult and protracted negotiations between firms 
that normally saw each other as competitors.
MTN, a rival pan-African operator, launched a special “low” roaming tariff for its customers 
based in South Africa, who were charged ZAR5 per minute for both making and receiving 
calls across the rest of Africa (MyBroadband, 2008). Sending an SMS cost ZAR1.50, while 
receiving one was free2.  At the end of 2010 the prices on its partner networks were ZAR5 for 
a local call, ZAR7 to call back to South Africa, ZAR4 to receive a call and ZAR2 to send an 
SMS (MTN, 2010).
In 2007, MTN Rwanda launched a seamless roaming service with partners in East Africa (see 
Table 9) (Highway News Agency, 2007). This allowed customers free roaming between the 
networks, receiving calls without charge, making calls at home rates and being able to use 
airtime vouchers purchased from local operators. However, the scheme was modified in 2009, 
so that customers paid the local rates rather than the home rates (MTN, 2009). While this 
avoided problems of net payments by the home operator to the roamed operator, where there 
were price differences, it diminished the transparency of the prices for the customer. MTN 
brands the service Home & Away, while its partners use the Kama Kawaida brand.
TABLE 9: JOINT ROAMING AGREEMENT IN EAST AFRICA 
Country Operator URL
Burundi U-Com‡ -
Kenya Safaricom* www.safaricom.co.ke
Rwanda MTN www.mtn.co.rw
2  These prices appear very similar to those required at that time by the EU Roaming Regulation.
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Country Operator URL
Tanzania Vodacom* www.vodacom.co.tz
Uganda MTN www.mtn.co.ug
Uganda Uganda Telecom www.utl.co.ug
   Source: The Monitor, 2008
MTN announced preferred roaming in 2008, initially covering South Africa, Botswana, Swaziland 
and Zambia (The Monitor, 2008). Then MTN said it would introduce a seamless roaming MTN 
One World for all its operations in Africa and the Middle East by mid-2009 (The New Vision, 
2008). In addition to the South African offer described above, MTN One World offers local 
country rate roaming tariffs in West Africa, but with very different prices depending on both the 
operator and the country (see Table 10) (MTN, 2010).
TABLE 10: MTN ONE WORLD RATES FOR ROAMING NIGERIAN CUSTOMERS   
                               (NIGERIAN NAIRA) 
Ghana Benin Cameroon Liberia Guinea
Bissau 
Guinea 
Conakry 
Ivory 
Coast 
Congo
Receiving 
Calls 
15 15 5 35 60 60 25 60
Sending 
SMS 
20 36 74 16 14 21 19 13
Calls to:
MTN Nigeria 21 51 124 25 41 22 37 31
Nigeria other 
networks
166 60 124 65 122 85 55 37
Africa, 
America, 
Asia Pacific, 
Europe & 
Middle East 
166 60 124 65 122 85 55 37
Satellite 1 418 2 943 1 813 1 081 784 1 357 1 397 659
Small 
Islands 
367 1,176 124 393 784 374 129 71
WECA MTN 
Benin 
64 51 124 25 41 22 37 31
Other 
networks in 
Benin 
166 77 124 65 122 85 55 37
WECA MTN 
Cameroon 
51 51 64 25 41 22 37 31
15
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Ghana Benin Cameroon Liberia Guinea
Bissau
Guinea 
Conakry
Ivory 
Coast
Congo
Other    
networks in  
 Cameroon  
166 60 74 65 122 85 55 37
WECA MTN 
Congo 
204 60 124 25 41 22 37 31
Other 
networks in 
Congo 
166 60 124 65 122 85 55 39
MTN Ivory 
Coast 
36 60 124 25 41 22 37 31
WECA MTN 
Ghana 
21 51 124 25 41 22 37 31
Other 
networks in 
Ghana  
22 60 124 65 122 85 55 37
WECA MTN 
Guinea 
Bissau 
79 60 124 25 41 22 37 31
Other 
networks in 
Guinea Bissau 
166 60 124 65 65 85 55 37
WECA MTN 
Guinea 
Conakry 
166 60 124 25 41 22 37 31
Other 
networks in 
Guinea 
Conakry 
166 60 124 65 122 23 55 37
WECA MTN 
Liberia 
32 60 124 25 41 22 37 31
Other 
networks in 
Liberia  
166 60 124 33 122 85 55 37
                         
   Source: MTN Nigeria Website
In July 2007, Glo Mobile, a Nigerian mobile operator, obtained a GSM licence for the 
neighbouring Republic of Benin (Okojie, 2008). In May 2009, Glo introduced Two Nations, 
One Call Rate, with no roaming charges between the two countries, aimed primarily at 
local travellers with a view to locking them in (Ukodie, 2009). The only rival to have 
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licences in both countries was MTN, engaged in creating more complex roaming tariffs 
without surcharges.
In 2009, Orange offered a special rate when roaming from Uganda to Kenya. Incoming calls 
were free, while local calls and calls to Kenya are UGX420 per minute (KES15.63 or 
ZAR1.60). That compared with an on-net rate in Uganda of UGX270 and off-net rate of 
UGX310, while calls from Uganda to Kenya are UGX420.
Orange created a zone of West African countries in 2007, comprising Guinea, Guinea 
Bissau, Ivory Coast, Mali and Senegal, with reduced prices for roaming (see Table 11). The 
operators offer limited pre-paid roaming, but extensive post-paid roaming (Orange, 2010).
TABLE 11: PRICES IN THE ORANGE ZONE OF WEST AFRICA IN 2009 (XOF OR     
                                FCFA)
Home country Countries Local Call home
Ivory Coast Orange Zone 177 177
Orange rest of Africa 500 1000
Europe 500 2000
Mali Senegal 150 150
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast & 
Niger
150 150
Senegal Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, 
Mali & Niger
150 150
XOF1000 = ZAR17.00
   Source: Websites of Orange, Orange Mali, Orange Senegal
In comparison with Zain, the responses appear piecemeal but pragmatic, focusing on what 
can be delivered and what is significant. Ovum has noted that the volumes of traffic being 
generated and the revenues won and lost by such deals did not seem very significant 
(Obiodu, nd). Nonetheless, when faced with a non-roaming offer a significant group of 
customers who are nomadic or migrant or whose family and friends are nomadic or migrant 
see the benefits and move to or remain with operators offering beneficial tariffs.
REGULATORY INITIATIVES
Following the investigation launched by the European Commission in 1999, the persistently 
high charges for IMR came to be perceived as a “regulatory” issue, one that was more likely 
to be solved by an authority than by the market. A number of regional economic groupings 
joined the EC in seeking out a solution. Some terminological confusion may have been 
caused by the EU Roaming Regulation, which is a transnational statute, adopted under the 
European Community Treaty, its connection with regulators being instructions to them to 
collect data.
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In 2005, the African Telecommunication Union (ATU) and the African Development Bank (AfDB) 
began a project for a single African SIM-card (East African Standard, 2005). Subsequently, the 
ATU indicated it would “Develop a regulatory framework for the implementation of cross-border 
networks and pan African services such as regional roaming” in the period 2008-09 (Africa, 2006). 
While still considered a work item, no progress has been made for some years.
The Economic Community for the West African States (ECOWAS) has taken various steps to 
harmonise policies and regulations in order to facilitate regional integration of ICT markets. It 
adopted a road map for regulatory harmonisation and regional mobile roaming (ITU, 2006). As 
of 31 July 2005 there were 268 roaming agreements made by 23 of the 42 West African Operators 
(Sanou, 2005). At that time, in three countries not a single operator had a roaming partner in the 
ECOWAS area. For post-paid customers, heavy security deposits were required, between USD340 
and USD1 500, while even pre-paid customers faced one-time charges of between USD19 and 
USD47. There was one innovative marketing offer, with Telecel, present in six countries, called 
@SIM, in which the customer was given one SIM-card for the home network and others for the 
networks to be visited.
WATRA (the association of regulators) organised a feasibility study jointly with ECOWAS, on 
roaming and interconnection in the region (Ndukwe, 2003). This concluded that pre-paid roaming 
was a “honeypot” for operators, if they could provide an IMR service (Aihe, 2007). Conferences 
on roaming were held in 2007 and 2008. However, this work subsequently ground to a halt, with 
its focus shifted to cutting costs for international calls within West Africa.
The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) addressed roaming charges through a 
Home and Away roaming initiative by ministers in 2007. In November 2008, the Communications 
Regulators’ Association of Southern Africa (CRASA) discussed the SADC Home and Away 
Roaming initiative. It then created a Regional Alliance Task Team (RATT) with representatives 
from:
•	 SADC	Secretariat
•	 CRASA
•	 GSM	Association	Africa
•	 Southern	Africa	Telecommunication	Association	(SATA)	
•	 SADC	Parliamentary	Forum.
Its primary task was to investigate possible mechanisms to reduce the high charges for IMR 
within the region, with a view to a final decision to be taken by SADC Ministers. CRASA hired 
consultants to undertake an impact assessment of its roaming initiative, whose report was 
discussed at its meeting in early 2010 and published later that year (Analysys Mason, 2010). It 
noted the usual strange variations, and sometimes a lack of transparency, in prices, largely 
attributed to high wholesale prices, though complicated by problems with international gateways 
and exchange rate fluctuations3.  Additionally, there were technical problems, including poor 
quality of service.
3  There may also have been concerns by some MNOs about the creditworthiness of other MNOs.
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The regulatory approaches to IMR have been less than productive. Possible penalties or interventions 
have been seen by MNOs as highly unlikely to be imposed and thus failed to convince them to 
act. Moreover, the capacity for any one country to regulate is limited and many already have a 
transnational commercial offer from Airtel/Zain or from a rival. Indeed, it has been commercial 
actions and reactions that have driven down IMR prices and consequently it has become 
progressively more difficult to justify an intervention, requiring complex work on regulatory 
impact assessments. The real challenge would be to develop a regulatory intervention that 
would build on the One Network approach, for example by widening its scope, adding more 
MNOs or by encouraging MNOs to create a roaming exchange or spot market.
OPEN CONNECTIVITY
Established in 2005 by the GSM Association, the Open Connectivity (OC) programme was intended 
to facilitate easier and faster outbound roaming agreements for MNOs, helping new and smaller 
operators increase the scope of the IMR service they offered their clients. With more than 700 
operators, the traditional bilateral approach was claimed to have reached its limits. Within the OC 
framework a number of hubs would provide access to multiple IMR partners via a single commercial 
agreement; ultimately these are expected to interconnect through peering arrangements (see 
Table 12).
TABLE 12: OPEN CONNECTIVITY COMPLIANT ROAMING HUBS IN LATE 2010
Company Country Website
Aicent US www.aicent.net
BICS Belgium www.bics.com
Comfone Switzerland www.comfone.com
Link2one Luxembourg www.l2one.com
Orange France www.orange.com/wholesalesolutions/
pagesinv/valeurs2.jsp
Syniverse US www.syniverse.com
United Hubbing UK www.unitedhubbing.com
Vodafone UK www.vodafone.com
  
 Source: GSMA Association, Open Connectivity Programme
For example, Rwandatel struck an IMR-hub deal with BICS, giving it access to 535 
networks worldwide through Proximus, the mobile subsidiary of Belgacom (Rwandatel, 
2009). Rwandatel customers were to be issued with SIM-cards with both Rwandatel 
and Proximus International Mobile Subscriber Identities (IMSIs). Where Rwandatel 
has no bilateral roaming agreement, then the SIM-card would automatically present 
the roaming customer as being from Proximus, becoming a virtual Belgian, to use its 
wider set of IMR agreements. The deal is not bilateral, so that Rwandatel does not 
immediately benefit from incoming roaming customers or lower prices – these must 
still be negotiated bilaterally.
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While the hubbing arrangement appears to open the way to easier access to outbound 
roaming, there is no evidence that it reduces prices. Indeed, even where a hub has access to 
regulated wholesale roaming prices in the EU, there appears to be neither a legal obligation nor any 
obvious commercial incentive to pass on the lower price to non-EU operators. Competition between 
the hubs appears to focus on increased coverage for a few high-spending outbound roamers, rather 
than on reducing prices.
CONCLUSION
Visitors to Africa who elect to use the roaming service from their home mobile network 
operators can maintain their usual telephone number and remain connected. They have to pay 
heavily to do so and any local African wishing to call them has to pay the international rate to 
call their home network. If visitors give up their home number and roam instead with a SIM-
card acquired locally, they can save considerably on the charges, but then have to advise 
colleagues, family and friends of a new and temporary number, plus they should periodically 
check their home voicemail. Likewise, Africans with post-paid subscriptions who leave the 
continent will pay very high roaming charges in order to remain in seamless contact, perhaps 
being asked to pay a substantial deposit for the privilege. Alternatively, they too can switch to 
local prepaid SIM-cards with the associated lower charges, but at increased inconvenience.
Prepaid roamers have a more limited choice – largely because of the costs they are not offered 
a service in more exotic locations. Each operator has typically set up one or two dozen bilateral 
deals with operators in major travel destinations, usually with neighbours, significant trading 
partners and, especially, the former colonial powers. The importance of these arrangements is 
difficult to assess, since there are very few data on the levels of use of pre-paid roaming.
The Open Connectivity initiative by the operators simplifies some wholesale arrangements for 
roaming. This means that customers should have access to a wider range of networks and to 
advanced roaming services, though it has done nothing to reduce prices.
While the European Commission was able, if ill-advised, to block the introduction of transnational 
tariffs without a roaming surcharge, Zain did this in Africa without hindrance (EC, 2002). 
Where rivals saw the need to respond in order to retain customers, they have done so, though 
generally on a smaller scale and on specific and commercially important routes.
The vast majority of individual Africans cannot afford expensive roaming rates, at several 
dollars per minute, whether post-paid or pre-paid, so that it is reasonable for mobile operators 
to abandon traditional IMR charges. A prerequisite is that each operator be allowed its own 
international gateway, with which it can make deals within a corporate group or with commercial 
partners. Moreover, it does not preclude charging high wholesale roaming rates to operators 
in developed countries, which easily pass these on to their customers, admittedly with a large 
and seemingly increasing mark-up by the foreign partner.
The failure to form a wholesale roaming market remains something of a mystery. With 
international voice telephony and Internet traffic there are intermediaries and aggregators to 
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facilitate smaller and niche market players. There appear to be significant structural obstacles 
and, possibly, anti-competitive practices that impede the formation of such a market for roaming 
services.
There is nothing to stop operators such as Orange and Vodafone giving African customers a 
secondary IMSI, for example from one of their European networks, to allow them access to 
the low regulated roaming rates. While this might increase their competitiveness on the retail 
market it seems to be considered unlikely to generate a sufficient number of new customers 
to overcome lost revenues.
While regional economic groupings and associations of regulators have taken an interest in 
high IMR charges, they have yet to achieve any significant results. They have not even 
coordinated the introduction of national measures that are known to work:
•	 Requiring	the	sending	of	an	SMS	with	IMR	prices	on	arrival	abroad
•	 Capping	retail	prices	for	call	forwarding		
•	 Capping	spending	to	avoid	“bill	shock”.
There are concerns that interventions might further distort the poorly understood market 
dynamics. Further detailed study of the economics of IMR markets is required to ensure a 
level of understanding that is sufficient to evaluate policy options. Minimally, this requires the 
collection of considerable data from the operators.
Work at the African Telecommunication Union (ATU) and in West Africa ground to a halt 
because of the complexity of the problem, the poor alignment of interests and the opposition of 
the operators. The recent study for CRASA illustrated the complexity of the problem, including 
the lack of data.
The scope for further research is considerable. On one level the retail prices charged by non-
African operators require further study to understand why they appear to be rising. On a very 
practical level, survey work with Africans crossing borders would help to explain attitudes 
towards costs and behaviour, in particular ownership of SIM-cards from foreign operators. 
Surveys of tourists and business travellers from developed countries would also provide insights 
into their communication needs and their willingness to pay very high prices. It would be helpful 
to map flows of visitors within Africa onto the various special tariffs and to identify any remaining 
obstacles to offers of roaming without surcharges. With the growing adoption of mobile 
broadband, analyses of the prices for, and the use of, data roaming are becoming increasingly 
important. The activities of the economic groupings and of their regulatory groups require 
further analysis, in order to better understand the roles they can usefully play in the governance 
of transnational telecommunications markets, their requirements for capacity building and any 
improvements that can be made to institutions and procedures.
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